Russia and Belarus: Are Dictatorships and Societies Different?|KaunoDiena.lt

2022-09-10 01:13:50 By : Ms. Michelle Jiang

In recent weeks, a series of essays published by the Washington Post revealed what was happening behind the scenes of politicians on the eve of the war in Ukraine.It describes in detail how the war was brewing, what happened in the White House, around Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, and there is no mention at all of Alexander Lukashenko.Has he ceased to be a subject?What are the general prospects of the Belarusian dictator?Is the degree of responsibility not only of both dictators, but also of the people of Russia and Belarus, the situation of emigrants the same?"A. Lukashenko was not included in the decision-making process.He was only being informed about what had already been decided," Belarusian analyst Artiomas Shraibmans believes. The political scientist living in exile shared the answers to these questions and his thoughts on the fundamental differences between the Russian and Belarusian societies with the audience of the Bild daily on the YouTube channel."The night before the war, he spoke on the phone with V. Putin.It is obvious: it was necessary to warn the Belarusian border guards to let the Russian tanks pass.Was he warned a month, a week ago?I doubt it because he is an unreliable conversationalist.If we think of Putin as a person obsessed with cookies, it is hard to imagine that he would have leaked the information in advance.This would mean that he entrusted the biggest secret of his life to a person who has many times disclosed the details of the conversations to others, even to journalists", believes A. Šraibmanas and emphasizes that not knowing the exact circumstances of the attack does not reduce A. Lukashenko's responsibility.- How useful is it to A. Lukashenko that the West does not consider him a player?- Very useless.Not being an entity, he can't play an autonomous game even if he wanted to like in 2014-15.to return to the stage of rapprochement with the West, to distance ourselves from Russia.At that time, there were many skeptics, especially in the neighborhood - the Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine, who said that this was V. Putin's attempt to play through A. Lukashenko.However, the main powers believed in it, canceled the sanctions, even high-ranking US officials went to Minsk.No one will believe him now.Until his distance from V. Putin is such that he can no longer be ignored, no one will pay attention to any hints or gestures.This is a big problem for him, because it restricts the freedom of maneuver.It will not be enough to free a hundred prisoners, it will not be enough to say something about the non-recognition of the DNR, the LNR (the quasi-state Donetsk and Luhansk republics established in Russian-occupied territories - ed.past.).All this has already been spit on by everyone.People don't notice it anymore.I think not only in the West, but also in Russia.– But time is usually their ally.Time passes and although it seemed that no one would ever forgive, forget, suddenly the response is more forgiving.- Yes, it happens.There was an illegal Bolshevik coup, but over time the world recognized the Bolsheviks and began to work with them.Time, of course, heals hurts.Among other things, due to the fact that there is a certain change of leaders and officials in the West.New leaders are coming, diplomats who want to put the unblocking of previously blocked projects into their piggy bank of success.Such a naive approach leads to the emergence of a new relationship reboot, one with Russia, one with Belarus.Those two leaders have been in power for 20 years (28 in the case of A.Lukashenko) and they already understand this dynamic, they have seen it many times, they know how to play.In the West, the situation is poor with the so-called institutional memory, and they - personally, not institutions - remember how to behave.But everything has limits.You can downplay your willingness to negotiate a bit - you won't have enough life to get to the moment when there will be no more obstacles.It seems to me that in the case of V. Putin, his resource is blackmail, nuclear and otherwise, the blockade of Ukraine.But it's hard for me to imagine that someone would start talking to him because he's getting better and not out of fear.- A.Lukashenko's situation changes when something stronger, worse appears.- For A.Lukashenka, that position was always V.Putin.He used to say to the West: yes, you don't like me, but look what's happening there.So the question is: is there anything in this region that the West could consider an even greater threat than an aggressive war with tens of thousands of casualties?Fantasy is not enough for me.- But to what extent is Lukashenko not considered as toxic in the West now as two years ago?Is he part of this war?- If we look at the fact that there is a certain pedestal on which the main European villain and the non-main villain stand, then A. Lukashenko, who in 2020was in the first place, now it has been given to V. Putin.They exchanged places on this pedestal.But does that mean you have to talk to the person in second place?In the 2020s, the West stopped believing that this man could keep his word.When you cheat for the third time, no matter how bad the institutional memory is, officials and diplomats start thinking: I have a few years, so is it worth banging your head against the wall if you cheat again?A. Lukashenko now has to do something to interest countries and politicians.He tried to do this with the grain agreement, offering Belarus as an alternative route.It was an interesting test.No one was interested - everyone, including Ukraine, rejected this option.It is so toxic that there was no one - except the Secretary General of the United Nations - who said: let's try it with Belarus.– You mentioned the Baltic countries.You know how much they are now in favor of restricting Russian entry.How does it work with Belarusians?Are Belarusians toxic to the Baltic countries or not?- Not so much.There are cases when Belarusians are lumped together with Russians.Latvia recently announced that it will not issue any more residence permits to Russians and Belarusians.Some other countries have imposed restrictions on students.However, these are rather exceptions.There are two huge differences: the 2020s, which in the minds of most (if not all) European countries separated Belarusians and the Belarusian authorities, so now nothing the Belarusian authorities do is associated with the Belarusian people, they are considered an anti-regime entity.There was nothing like it in Russia.I don't want to offend Russian liberals, but in Russia since 2011there were no such mass protests that would allow us to say that V.Putin has distanced himself (from the people - ed.past.).Surveys show that, on the contrary, the picture is slightly different.Reserve: the Belarusian battalion named after Konstantinas Kalinauskas will fight on the Ukrainian front - only a transitional stage./ Wikipedia photoThere is a second factor: the unique status of the Belarusian opposition in exile.The fact that there is another center of legitimacy that the Russian opposition does not have.Sviatlana Cichanouskaja has now created a government in exile.She can certainly call the leaders or ministers of other countries and seek the cancellation of such measures.This happened with both Estonia and the Czech Republic - it partially worked.In some cases, like in Poland, where most Belarusians have found refuge, including those who left Ukraine, like me, immigration practices have been relaxed.They were almost equal to the Ukrainians.Easy legalization rules for dozens or even hundreds of Belarusians should come into force soon - at least that's the promise.When there is some old history of communication with the Belarusian diaspora, as in the case of Lithuanians, they have long and well understood that Belarusians are not the government of Belarus.- You mentioned S. Cichanouskaja's office.Who is S. Cichanouskaja today?Belarus and those who left?- For those who live in Belarus, she is a controversial figure.There are supporters of the government who consider it a source of evil.There is a neutral part of society, which, judging by various polls, mostly even pro-Russian ones, in 2020supported S. Cichanouskaja.However, during these couple of years, they either became disillusioned with it or did not find reasons to support it, or simply distanced themselves from politics.There is a so-called protest nucleus.It also contains a different approach to S. Cichanouskaja.Some consider it too little decisive, some, on the contrary, too radical.However, in this group - maybe a third of the Belarusian society - it is considered as a certain legitimate center.If not the only one, because that group considers A. Lukashenko illegitimate.This does not exist in Russian society.Even the opposition members call V. Putin the president.In Belarus, whether you write (the word "president" next to your surname - ed.past.) or not reveals your political position.Accordingly, for those in emigration, S. Cichanouskaja is a less controversial figure because she is the representative of these wives.If there are any problems with legalization or discrimination, no one goes to the Belarusian embassy - everyone writes to S. Cichanouskaja's office and civil society structures related to it.A parallel quasi-state has emerged, which cannot have its own territory, bureaucracy, full-fledged army, but assumes some functions of the state.They are thinking about creating a passport, because Belarusians in exile are already having problems with (expiring - ed.past.) documents.- If it is a parallel country, is there also a power struggle in it?- Rather not because of the government, because there is nothing to manage, because S. Cichanouskaja's status does not come from the fact that she controls something, she sits on some kind of government resource, from which she can be thrown off a mountain.Her status comes from something as intangible as the legitimacy she gained in 2020.None of her potential competitors have anything like that and cannot have, because there is no election that can give a person such a status, not even in the international community.If we imagine a situation when S. Cichanouskaja decides to leave or is removed in some way, her place simply disappears.Therefore, even those people who criticized her very sharply in recent months and continue to criticize her, recognize her status and supremacy.That's why they tried to criticize her instead of creating something of their own.- But what is she criticized for?Does she have no power?- Most people in exile in Belarus have a positive attitude towards her.But because there are a few important, loud voices that allow themselves to be quite vocal in their criticism, there seems to be a conflict.However, these people do not have so many views (on social media channels - ed.past.).Therefore, I would not overestimate the phenomenon that it is under attack from all sides.The diaspora criticizes it in two streams: for non-inclusivity - that is, they say "you usurped contacts with the West, you usurped money flows, you don't allow other democratic politicians", and the other - for insufficient determination, it is enough to talk, in the paradigm of peaceful protests, foreign pressure, you need to prepare for war, create a quasi-army, openly admit that A.Lukashenko will not be overthrown by peaceful means, prepare for an armed uprising, and this should be carried out not by opposing groups, but by leaders.As she said when creating the government, it is necessary to "de-occupy" (Belarus - ed.past.).- How popular is this approach?- We do not know.It is impossible to find out.It became more popular because of the war.It became clear that as long as A.Lukashenka is in power and V.Putin has the ability and desire to support him, the Russian army will respond to all attempts to overthrow this man peacefully.I still feel like we're only seeing the tip of the iceberg, and we don't know the sentiments of most of it.But it became much clearer in public.The first cabinet created by S. Cichanouskaja included four more people besides her.Two former diplomats, Pavel Latuška and Valery Kovalevsky, two former representatives of the power structures: Alexander Azarov, a high-ranking former colonel of internal affairs, who heads the exile coalition of representatives of the power structures "Bypol", which supervised the so-called rail war, implementing the "Peremoha" plan, during which people are elected into decentralized groups to perform certain tasks at dawn at X hour after receiving instructions.The second person is Valerijus Sachaščikas, the former commander of the airborne brigade.Probably one of the most senior people who switched to the opposition side.He created Pohonia, a Belarusian unit in Ukraine, and is an interesting new figure whose videos on YouTube garner hundreds of thousands of views, who speaks like a military man and who demonstrates the transformation of the Belarusian opposition in two years.There is a transition from the cultural, business elite to the representatives of the power structures that prepare the internal and external resistance, some talk about a parallel army, although it is still far away.This reminds us of history - Anders' army (an army under the command of General Władysław Anders under the Polish government-in-exile - ed.past.) and others.parallel armies led by the government-in-exile.- If we were to talk about the units that are fighting on the side of Ukraine today, do we know what number we are talking about?- Not exactly.People in Ukraine who work with them talk about hundreds of people.Some say about a thousand.I think it's more realistic - about 500. Some split up, died.- It is not much, but more than the people of any other nationality fighting on the side of Ukraine.As there are more Kartvelians, there are also many Poles, but it seems that this is one of the largest national groups.Important: these people are united by a clear understanding that this is a transitional phase for them.Kartvel volunteers do not go to Ukraine to return to Sakartvel and overthrow their government.Most of the Belarusian volunteers see this way as helping the Belarusian resistance.This is a new phenomenon.Even if there are several hundred of them, in an emergency, in case of chaos, revolution, collapse of state structures, even a couple of hundred well-coordinated people can tip the scales to the other side.- You say that their common enemy is V. Putin.If we were to talk to any Ukrainian political scientist today, they would say that Russia or the Russians are the common enemy.Do I understand correctly that the Belarusian opposition separates V. Putin and the Russians?- The Belarusian opposition is very motley.There are probably many people who are close to the prevailing Ukrainian view that there is no (separation - ed.past.) Russia or V. Putin, there is one alliance.I think those people are fighting in Ukraine.The democratic movement itself understands that neither Belarus nor Russia will disappear from the map, nor will there be an "Ocean of Dreams" in their place.That after the war, even democratic Belarus will have to maintain relations with Russia due to complete economic dependence.This will not disappear even after A.Lukashenko.I think, at the end of his rule, it (Belarus's economic dependence on Russia - ed.past.) will have reached its highest point.Therefore, since the beginning of the revolution, all leaders of Belarus have said for at least a year that we are not against Russia, we want to establish stable relations with it.Eventually, when it became clear that V. Putin supports A. Lukashenko, Belarusian democrats began to criticize Russia, but still said that the Russian people are not our enemy.That Russia is Khabarovsk, students protesting in Moscow.The war probably radicalized attitudes.All this protection of Belarusian students abroad (visa exclusivity - ed.past.) is created by opposing Russians who support the war and Belarusians who do not support the war.In any case, the attitude towards Russia and the post-war relations between Belarus and Russia is more pragmatic, more down-to-earth than it is now in Ukraine.The view of Ukrainian society that after the war there must be a deep ditch, a border between Ukraine and what will be on the other side (Russia - ed.past.) is completely understandable.- You mentioned polls in Russia several times.Why do you think that it is a more representative instrument than in Belarus?I'm sure you would hardly rely on polls conducted in Belarus.- I would rely on it.The fear factor that everyone talks about when they talk about polls in totalitarian states is a real thing.But it can be measured.Sociologists at Russia's Levada Center have done tremendous work to measure the fear factor in responding to sensitive political questions before and after the war.And he hasn't changed.The fear factor can also be measured in Belarus.There are sociological tricks, dividing the sample, asking sensitive questions to some respondents and not asking them to others, writing sensitive questions at the beginning or end of the questionnaire.You can understand the percentage of people who start cheating if they see dangerous questions that are sensitive to them.These are standard methods of hypothesis testing.I'm part of a team doing surveys in Belarus, so I'm a bit in-depth.Yes, there are distortions, but in Belarus most surveys are conducted online, so pensioners and rural residents are excluded.But in any case, the dynamics can be observed.It doesn't lie if the same survey methods are used, if you follow the same rules.In Russia, absolutely all indicators - life satisfaction, level of happiness, economic optimism, ratings of V. Putin and "United Russia", other indicators - show the same picture, it cannot be ignored.You can't ignore when the polls in Belarus show a completely different picture, even though the public there is much more intimidated.I am sure that the question "Do you support our armed forces, our soldiers in a special military operation" is "fixed".When these kinds of questions are presented, they certainly push people into certain ruts.Such questions are asked by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM, an institution close to the Kremlin - ed. post).But when you ask much deeper questions like "Do you support 'going all the way' or do you support 'negotiation'", the numbers are slightly different - more people want to negotiate.But even there you see such a large proportion of people who are ready to support the operation to the end if the authorities decide to do so.This is going to bite the tsar.It cannot be ignored.It is not that everyone who is against the war is afraid to speak out.It can not be.Voice: Although Belarus is being used by Russia to stage attacks against Ukraine, most Belarusians do not support the country's military intervention./ Wikipedia photo- What are the numbers in Belarus?People who are included in the political context, who are not reconciled - how many are there in Belarus?- It's hard to understand.in 2020the number of politicized people had reached a maximum, and then due to repression, the fear dropped.However, in Belarus, as in Russia or elsewhere, the majority of the population is non-politicized.However, I think that among politicized Belarusians there is a big advantage for Ukraine.Of course, the society in Belarus is not only them.Both telephone and online surveys show a similar picture: more than 85 percentof Belarusians (according to some data, more than 90%) are against the country's full involvement in the war.It is interesting that two-thirds of Belarusians believe that Belarus is not participating in the war in any way.The fact that the territory is given to the Russian tanks, shelling of Ukraine, the residents of Belarus do not reflect or they do not receive such information.When asked whether or not to support Russia's actions, the picture is polarized.About a third of the surveys were conducted on the Internet, and more than 40% were conducted by telephone.Belarusians support Russia, support the presence of the Russian army on the territory of Belarus, its narrative that Ukraine is to blame.But more people don't support: 4:5 or 3:4.Society is divided, but with a majority on the side of those who do not support Russia.We see a rather serious trend of those who support Belarus' participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).For the first time in two years, the majority of Belarusians prefer not to be in the ODKB.This is interesting because it means that Russia is narrowing its (support - ed. past.) base in Belarusian society.- Does this mean that losing independence is a tragedy even for A.Lukashenka and an audience loyal to Russia?- Yes.People who support the unification of the two countries or the inclusion of Belarus in Russia are a minority, about 15 percent.It varies between 10-15 depending on the month.However, it was never more than 20 percent.I think that today the supporters of the merger are represented by the core of Lukashenko's supporters.If we were to survey A. Lukashenko's supporters, it could be 50 and 50, because A. Lukashenko has become such a polarizing figure in recent years that his fans, the Russian TV audience, are concentrated in the core of his supporters.In the first year after the election, he lost the support of the middle class of society.- How will A.Lukashenka evaluate the referendums (DNR, LNR - ed.past.) that will be held regarding accession to Russia?- Essentially.Is this not a threat to Lukashenko?- Understanding and having a choice are different things.I think it will be like Crimea: he will say everything that is required to be said, but he will not do anything else.If Russia demands that he recognize it as part of Russia, he will, because he has no other option, balance resources on this issue.In recent months since late spring, Belarus has begun to work openly with separatist authorities in Donetsk, Crimea and even Abkhazia.Contacts have begun at the official level.This was not the case before.This is a step towards not recognizing the subordination of these territories to the central government.It is as if the previous (Minsk - ed.) position of not having official relations (with the separatists, ed.) is disappearing.Although when Denis Pushilin (the leader of the Donetsk separatists - ed. past) arrived in Brest with, apparently, the leader of "United Russia", the Belarusian state media did not write anything about it.They allowed him to meet with officials - low level, neither the mayor nor the governor.There is still some desire not to crawl all the way into that hole, because crawling out of it after recognizing these quasi-republics would be difficult.Understanding and having a choice are different things.I think it will be like Crimea: he will say everything that is required to be said, but he will not do anything else.- What is happening with people or their teams that were popular in 2020?What is happening with Cepkalas?- Valerijus Cepkala and his wife Veronika Cepkala - two politicians.They became dissidents within the opposition.They criticize S. Cichanouskaja more than others.They tried or created a parallel structure of activists who are not satisfied with S. Cichanouskaja as much as A. Lukashenka.Because of their criticism, their personalities, the rest of the democratic forces did not take them on board.They live, if I'm not mistaken, in Greece, they blame S. Cichanouska, the media, the forces associated with S. Cichanouska, the creation of a dictatorship.And this is probably the most famous split.From the trio of women, Marija Kolesnikava is kali, and V. Cepkala has become the biggest critic of S. Cichanouskaja.- What happened to the supporters of M. Kalesnikava and Viktor Babaryka (Belarusian businessman who tried to participate in the 2020 presidential elections, was sentenced to 14 years in prison - ed. post)?They joined S. Cichanouskaja?- In order to answer this question, we need to conduct research.V. Babaryka's supporters were and, I think, remain mostly among the democratic society.It is a slightly more moderate force than S. Cichanouskaja.I think that some of V. Babaryka's supporters depoliticized, went into internal emigration, some are watching the team's statements, waiting for the leaders to go free.Some part joined other opposition structures.However, I think that the majority of V. Babaryka's supporters are not always comfortable hearing the statements of the opposition in exile.They were against sanctions from the beginning.- They were considered more pro-Russian?- But they weren't like that.If you analyze 2020statements, you can see that V. Babaryka's team and he himself were on the opposite side: they suggested leaving the ODKB.People like V. Cepkala said the opposite: we are one nation with the Russians.And when Valery Cepkala left Belarus, he first went to Moscow.in 2020there were five people (presidential candidates - ed. post), only two are known to everyone: A.Lukašenka and S.Cichanouskaja.All others remain free in Belarus.Ana Kanapacka is completely passive.Rather, she clung to power for a while.Two other politicians, Sergey Cherechny and Andrey Dmitriyev, are rarely seen.One has a more clear structure, Govori pravdu, S. Čerešnis has a party that almost no one notices anymore.They speak with a more moderate stance, analogous to Russia's Yabloko.But they are free.They criticize the authorities, obviously, constantly balancing on the line, as the power structures will decide: whether they have already crossed the line or not.There are politicians of the old opposition, who by 2020there was, but they are silent.Independent trade unions were the last to criticize the government.Their leadership was installed a couple of months ago.It has been a long time since journalists, political scientists, and opinion makers are imprisoned.We are already at the next stage.Much less free than in Russia.- Probably similar numbers between 2020who left Belarus and Russia.The percentage expression is obviously higher.How much do you think these two waves have mixed?Maybe they are kept separate?- Your wave is young.I'm not sure she messes with anyone at all.During the first months of emigration, people rarely leave their bubble, their diaspora, their circle of friends.Belarusians managed to create parallel structures for themselves: business, kindergartens, schools, various services.Therefore, I think it hasn't happened yet, and it won't happen soon at the level of activists and politicians.Different interests, abilities to present themselves.I don't know what this would do for the democratic forces of Belarus or the active diaspora.It will probably take place at the level of human relations.At the level of representative offices and structures, I think it would be rather a burden for Belarusians.- To what extent did February 24 change the attitude of the Belarusian opposition to language?- Every manifestation of the Russian world and its aggressiveness gives a great impetus to all of Russia's neighbors to strengthen their national identity.Belarus is no exception.I see many Belarusians switching to Belarusian.I hear that families naturally start speaking Belarusian.The toxicity that V. Putin brought to the world also spreads to Russian culture, language, and soft powers, if they still exist.Such an impulse was also present in 2014 and 2015.Back then, even the authorities supported such a trend, which they even called soft Belarusianization.Now, rather, it hinders, because the activists of the government have become Russophiles, pro-imperial persons for whom Belarusianness is rather a risk.Therefore, Belarusian publishing houses and bookstores are closing down in Belarus, guides are being arrested for allegedly treating history incorrectly.- Is Belarus closer to a totalitarian state than an authoritarian one?Closer to totalitarianism than Russia?- And yes and no.Because what distinguishes totalitarian from authoritarian is not only the scale of repression (in which Belarus is more advanced than Russia), not only the vertical consolidation of power (Belarus is also probably more advanced), but also the mobilizing mandatory ideology.I think that since the beginning of the war, there are more Z ideologies in Russia than there are anti-Western ideologies supported by A.Lukashenko in Belarus.In that sense, Russia is closer to a totalitarian state.Yoko Ono: The Garden of Freedom's KnowledgeLSMU Rector Prof.Inauguration celebrations of Rimantas BenetisPeople are mourning the death of Queen Elizabeth IIMeeting of Seimas board members with the president