For 15min readers, we present this article a little abbreviated.As the absolute majority of military experts and analysts understand today, in 2022February 24The large-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has long gone beyond the concept of a local conflict of moderate intensity.This applies to spatial indicators, the number of forces involved and the list of weaponry and other high-tech equipment specific to this military confrontation.The main question is how long the said conflict will last.After all, it does not fit into the time of the announced Russian "blitzkrieg" or the phases of active hostility in any of the 21st century.at the beginning of the wars.In any case, the war has been going on for months.And there is reason to believe that it will not end in 2022.With this in mind, it is natural to look at the prospects for the next year and not limit yourself to just predictions and assumptions.Such a perspective should be entirely practical.Namely, how far should Ukraine's military ambitions extend?Also, what specific help does the Armed Forces of Ukraine need from partners in the coming year 2023?(..)Given that the strategic initiative belongs to the aggressor, it is quite logical to start with the description of the situation in which the Russian side may find itself.Preliminary lines of contact already allow us to predict the limits of Russia's ambitions in relation to further advances in Ukraine.Certain operational prospects are visible in the districts of Izium and Bachmut.The likely final goal of Russia's efforts can be considered the achievement of the administrative border of the Donetsk region.Progress in the direction of Zaporizhia seems even more attractive to the enemy.This would ensure further action to the north and would allow a direct threat to capture the cities of Zaporizhia and Dnipro, which in turn would result in the Ukrainian side losing control of a large part of the country's left bank (Dnipro river - ed. post).Revised plans to take control of Kyiv and the threat of a renewed invasion from the territory of the Republic of Belarus cannot be ruled out.The success in the southern part of Ukraine, if it is used quickly and properly, can have a double effect.However, the most opportunities open up a further march in the direction of Southern Bukh from the operational forward bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River.The success in the southern part of Ukraine, if it is used quickly and properly, can have a double effect.On the one hand, this would open quite realistic prospects of capturing Mykolaiv and Odesa, on the other hand, it would create a threat towards Kryvyi Rih, before threatening the central and western regions of Ukraine.In this article, we have deliberately chosen not to examine the conditions under which Russia might decide on these scenarios.At the same time, we should not discount the whole range of related strategic and even global problems that this would create for the Russian Federation.Among them is international isolation, as well as economic pressure due to international sanctions, the problem of global mobilization, the lack of modern weapons and equipment, which will become more acute with time.In addition to purely military benefits, such strategic actions in the east and south of Ukraine will bring additional political and economic dividends for Russia.Among them are ensuring the security of the self-proclaimed "republics" and the logical, albeit delayed, end of the so-called "special operation", cutting off Ukraine's access to the Black Sea, gaining control of the main element of the country's energy system - the nuclear power plant of Southern Ukraine, etc.It is easy to conclude that such a promising success in the south and partly in the east of Ukraine in a territorial sense must be based on a reliable defense and the preservation of control over the temporarily occupied autonomous republic of Crimea.Indeed, Crimea has been and remains the backbone of supply routes on the southern strategic flank of Russian aggression.The territory of the peninsula allows for the deployment of a large amount of troops and supplies.Finally, Crimea is home to the main naval base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, as well as a network of airfields that allow it to carry out airstrikes over almost the entire territory of mainland Ukraine.Some analysts tend to believe that it is the control of the territory of the Crimean peninsula that Russian forces consider the center of gravity of the ongoing war.However, looking at the situation that Ukraine's armed forces are likely to face in 2023, these things do not seem so clear.In reality, the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be a complex combination of the actual line of contact, the available resources, the reserve of combat readiness forces and, of course, the strategic initiative, which will remain in the hands of the enemy.Extensive Russian efforts to penetrate Ukrainian defenses limit any operational maneuver and require a substantial doubling of forces in the area to contain the enemy.The situation is particularly aggravated by the lack of means of fire and insufficient anti-aircraft defense.Following the aforementioned logic, it is necessary to pay attention to the doubts regarding the perspective of the preliminary contact line from Ukraine.Its contours have an extremely unfavorable configuration in the already mentioned directions of Izium and Bachmut.Extensive Russian efforts to penetrate Ukrainian defenses limit any operational maneuver and require a substantial doubling of forces in the area to contain the enemy.The situation is particularly aggravated by the lack of means of fire and insufficient anti-aircraft defense.The situation in the south and east is not much better.The threat of the enemy advancing on Zaporizhzhia has already been mentioned.In addition, there remains the threat of the enemy's partial success from the direction of Khuliajpole, which may, under certain conditions, threaten to encircle the entire Ukrainian army group in the east of Ukraine.The fact that the enemy has an operational forward bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River requires additional efforts to prevent its development.The only way to fundamentally change the strategic situation is undoubtedly for the Ukrainian army in 2023.to organize several counterstrikes in a row, and preferably at the same time.It would be difficult to overestimate their military, as well as political and informational significance.At the same time, more attention should be paid to the issue of their planning and execution.This topic can be narrowed down to the following concept: What forces and means are needed to achieve this goal?If in 2023campaign as a turning point, we must return to defining Russia's center of gravity in this conflict.After all, only an effective impact on the enemy's center of gravity can change the course of the war.If such a center of gravity is the control of Crimea, it is logical to assume that in 2023an operation or series of operations will be planned to retake the peninsula.Such planning must first of all be based on the assumption that the necessary reserve of troops will be built up.And we are certainly not talking about the units of the Ukrainian army already operating on the 2,500 km long front line from Kherson to Kovel.In preparation for the offensive campaign, Ukraine needs to create one or more operational (operational-strategic) force groups consisting of 10 to 20 brigades of the combined armed forces.In preparation for the offensive campaign, Ukraine needs to create one or more operational (operational-strategic) groups of forces consisting of 10 to 20 brigades of the combined armed forces, depending on the intentions and ambitions of the Ukrainian leadership.In the current situation, this could be done only by replacing the main types of weaponry of the already existing brigades with modern ones, which would be provided by Ukrainian partners.Separately, the need to purchase more missiles and ammunition, artillery systems, missile launchers, electronic warfare equipment, etc. should be emphasized.All this will require the consolidated efforts of all partner countries, which will require considerable time and financial resources.Strictly speaking, all this directly and exclusively depends on the available resources of Ukraine.While the situation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine may seem quite promising in terms of troop numbers, the same cannot be said for heavy weapons and ammunition.However, in any case, if there is political will, timely and thoughtful planning, using the industrial base and reserves of the world's leading countries, the task of creating and properly equipping such groups is seen as completely realistic.However, the approach to 2023 is outlined.the definition of the tasks of the military campaign seems too one-sided for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.So we are forced to return once again to the fact that Ukraine needs to accurately define the enemy's center of gravity.With this in mind, we should leave aside the question of whether it is appropriate at a strategic level to associate the concept of "center of gravity" with a certain territory or region.We will only note that it is the source of mental and physical power, strength, and resistance—what Clausewitz called "the concentration of all power and motion upon which everything depends . . . the point to which all our energies must be directed."Suppose that the armed forces of Ukraine in 2023will achieve complete success in the campaign and regain control of the Crimean peninsula.Again, it is difficult to overestimate the extremely positive political and informational significance of such a strategic success.At the same time, the military significance of such a victory can be assessed differently.Russia would lose its Black Sea Fleet military base, its network of airfields, large reserves of material resources, and likely suffer huge losses in manpower and equipment.Summarizing the above, when discussing the prospects after 2023, one can only talk about a new stage of confrontation.At the same time, nothing can prevent the painful, if quite real, transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the Novorossiysk naval base on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, so Russia's military presence in the region will remain, along with the threat of missile strikes.The same can be assumed about the transfer of Russian warplanes to Primorsk-Akhtarsk and Yeisk airfields.The loss of large reserves of material resources will affect the Russian military only temporarily.Manpower losses and destroyed machinery, at least in terms of numbers, can also add up over time.Summarizing the above, when discussing the prospects after 2023, one can only talk about a new stage of confrontation.Of course, initial data and perspectives will differ, but even in this case, it will be a long conflict, with human losses and enormous costs, and the final outcome will not be clear.So now a slightly different approach to determining the center of gravity of Russian forces and the very essence of the ongoing war is proposed.The main feature of the fight against the Russian military is not that Russia is massively ahead of Ukraine in terms of manpower and weaponry, and not even that the strategic operation against Ukraine is large-scale.The decisive factor is the vastly disproportionate capacity.This is most noticeable when it comes to the maximum range of the means of destruction.In the case of the Russian armed forces, it is up to 2,000 km, based on the range of cruise missiles, while in the case of the Ukrainian forces, it is actually only 100 km, limited by the range and depth of deployment of outdated short-range ballistic missile systems.Thus, since the beginning of the large-scale aggression, Russian weapons were able to hit targets 20 times further away than Ukrainian ones.Translated into the language of military practice, this means that the Ukrainian armed forces can at best use outdated missile launch systems and strike no further than the depth of the enemy's operational rear.At the same time, the enemy can strike with impunity against targets in the entire depth of the country's territory.It is this capability that should be considered the center of gravity of the Russian military from a military point of view.As long as the current situation persists, this war may continue for many years.It is this capability that should be considered the center of gravity of the Russian military from a military point of view.As long as the current situation persists, this war may continue for many years.Of course, it is impossible to immediately deprive the enemy of such an important advantage.Given the volume of resources available to the Russian military, the very possibility of completely eliminating this advantage is highly doubtful.At the same time, it is quite possible to counter the enemy with its own capabilities to act in a similar way, operating at a similar distance.Of course, we are talking about Ukraine's partners supplying relevant weapon systems or certain types of ammunition.For example, the MGM-140B ATACMS Block 1A missile for the M142 HIMARS.The rearmament of artillery and missile forces, tactical aviation, the Navy and other components of Ukraine's military power must be followed by a comprehensive approach.Discussions should address the creation or development of capabilities, not just the amount of weapons and equipment to be supplied to the brigades slated for rearmament.Only in this case could we talk about influencing the actual center of gravity of Russia in this war.The problem is that for most Russians this war is of a "distant" nature.Due to the absence of proximity to the war, they are not so painfully aware of all the losses, failures and, most importantly, the costs of this war in every sense.A convincing example is the successful efforts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to physically transfer the zone of hostilities to the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.This was done after several successful missile strikes on enemy air bases in Crimea, primarily on the Saki airfield.The task of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023- to make this experience even more acute and tangible for the Russians and other occupied regions, despite the great distance to the targets.The question needs to be raised even more broadly: where does the Russian leadership and public have the confidence, readiness and, most importantly, the need to support the war in Ukraine and sincerely believe that it must be ended according to plan?In addition to well-known reasons, such as the Kremlin's desire to gain at least regional leadership, to satisfy claims to "stand up" and some openly imperial ambitions that are acceptable to ordinary Russians, there is also a purely practical reason.It is specifically related to the principles of the use of the Russian army.It is about an aggressive type of war of destruction launched against a nation that does not have the military power to adequately oppose the Russian army.Simply put, it is precisely about the impunity that is ensured by the absence of physical proximity.This is the true center of gravity of the enemy.And we have no right to leave it without due attention.Simply put, it is precisely about the impunity that is ensured by the absence of physical proximity.This is the true center of gravity of the enemy.And we have no right to leave it without due attention.With proper planning and proper cooperation with Ukraine's partner countries, the situation can change fundamentally.A comprehensive effort to equip and rearm the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapons systems of the right scale, with a proper vision of long-term goals, should become a long-awaited change.Only by balancing the range of weapons and thereby disrupting the aforementioned center of gravity of the enemy can we achieve a turning point in the ongoing war.If Ukraine manages to get the right weapons, in 2023operational and strategic perspectives will look completely different.The mere threat that the Ukrainian armed forces will use the appropriate range of destruction means will force Russia to review the nature, course and results of the ongoing confrontation.However, Ukraine may consider acquiring relevant weapon systems from partners only as a transitional solution.Since the first days of Russian aggression, the Ukrainian side has been faced with the critical problem of how to restore and develop its design and production capabilities for the production of high-tech weapons systems.Tactical and technical requirements for such systems should already include relevant parameters, including their operating range.There is no doubt that Ukraine's national efforts for this purpose open up unlimited opportunities for international military-technical cooperation with partner countries.The mere threat that the Ukrainian armed forces will use the appropriate range of destruction means will force Russia to review the nature, course and results of the ongoing confrontation.When considering the prospects of cooperation with partners in the supply of armaments to Ukraine, it is worth paying attention to two important factors that, since the beginning of Russian aggression, had a significant impact on the adoption of relevant decisions, as well as the conditions and volumes of supply.The first of these is a general misconception about the scale of the Russian-Ukrainian war.Despite the most extensive media coverage, it is still difficult for the world's population, primarily Europeans, to even imagine actual World War II-style combat operations.It is difficult for them to imagine a line of contact thousands of kilometers long, tens of thousands of military equipment and more than a million armed people participating directly or indirectly in the war.Air-raid sirens, missile attacks and bombing of peaceful settlements, refugee and prisoner-of-war flows, river-crossing operations and tank breakthroughs - for most people around the world, all this remains just a ghost story of the last century's two world wars.At the same time, all this has already become an integral part of everyday life for the people of Ukraine and the armed forces.In terms of personnel and equipment, Ukraine's efforts to counter Russian aggression have already exceeded certain indicators of hostilities on its territory during World War II.Effective resistance against a group of more than 300,000 Russian armed forces required the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people and the provision of tens of thousands of military equipment.As for the daily ammunition expenditure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in terms of artillery rounds per gun, it is three times higher than the indicators recorded by the artillery of the British Army during the First World War.Considering the duration of the war and 2023campaign outlook, it is unlikely that these numbers will decrease.Ukraine's efforts to survive a superpower attack require and will continue to require significant material resources.in 2023large-scale military and technical assistance from partner countries must remain the material basis of Ukrainian resistance.After all, despite its own losses due to Russian sanctions, dependence on Russian energy and individual attempts to appease Russia, no country in the history of the world will ever be forgiven for pandering to a bloodthirsty predator that poisons itself even more with spilled blood.It is hard to imagine that even nuclear strikes will allow Russia to break Ukraine's will to resist.However, the threat to Europe as a whole cannot be ignored.Another factor is the immediate threat of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.The battles on the territory of Ukraine have already shown how seriously the Russian Federation ignores the issues of global nuclear security even during a conventional war.First of all, from 2022July.Russian troops established a military base at the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant and deployed heavy artillery, including BM-30 "Smerch" multiple rocket launchers, on its territory.It is hard to imagine that even nuclear strikes will allow Russia to break Ukraine's will to resist.However, the threat to Europe as a whole cannot be ignored.The possibility that the leading world powers will be directly involved in a "limited" nuclear conflict cannot be completely ruled out, bringing the prospect of the Third World War closer.We must return to the source of Russia's self-confidence - impunity.Any attempt by Russia to take practical steps toward the use of tactical nuclear weapons must be thwarted using the full arsenal of tools available to world powers.After all, from this moment on, the Russian Federation will become not only a threat to the peaceful coexistence of Ukraine, its neighbors and many European countries, but also a real global terrorist state.In our opinion, it is precisely with such a complex and ambiguous combination of factors in mind that the 2023prospects of a military campaign.Only a comprehensive and detailed consideration of them will create the conditions for Ukraine to defeat the aggressor's army and end the destructive war raging in Europe.First month - only 0.99 EUR, then - 4.99 EUR/month.*Additional operator service fee is included when paying by phone.Meanwhile, paying by bank card will not cost you anything extra.The indicated prices are valid only for natural persons.Subscription offers for companies and organizations - prenumerata@15min.lt.